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This paper evaluates the simplifying assumption that producers compete in a large
market without substantial strategic interactions using nonparametric regressions of
producers’ choices on market size. With such atomistic competition, increasing the
number of consumers leaves the distributions of producers’ prices and other choices
unchanged. In many models featuring non-trivial strategic considerations, producers’
prices fall as their numbers increase. I examine observations of restaurants’ sales, seat-
ing capacities, exit decisions, and prices from 222 U.S. cities. Given factor prices and
demographic variables, increasing a city’s size increases restaurants’ average sales and
decreases their exit rate and prices. These results suggest that strategic considerations
lie at the heart of restaurant pricing and turnover.
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Observations of producers’ actions from ﬁrm registries or national statistical agencies typ-
ically lack an accompanying description of their strategic environments. This unfortunate
fact tempts one to assume that producers compete anonymously in a large market, but ca-
sual observation nearly always suggests some scope for strategic interaction between ﬁrms.
This paper quantiﬁes this informal suspicion using nonparametric regressions of producers’
choices on market size. The data come from 222 U.S. cities’ restaurant industries and are
reported in the 1992 Census of Retail Trade. Under the null hypothesis of atomistic competi-
tion, market size has no impact on these decisions. This result is familiar from highly stylized
models of Chamberlinian monopolistic and perfect competition, and this paper proves it in a
very general framework without substantial restrictions on the market demand system, pro-
ducers’ cost functions, or the variables over which they compete. It requires nonparametric
regressions to display no inﬂuence of market size on producers’ choices given a suﬃciently
rich set of control variables. In fact, restaurants in larger cities have lower prices, exit less
frequently, and have greater sales revenues. Even if one ﬁnds atomistic competition implau-
sible ex ante, the theory and regressions together quantify how the strategic environment
inﬂuences producers’ observable choices. Such quantiﬁcation is essential for extending the
domain of strategically-oriented empirical industrial organization to large markets.
The analysis rests on a nonparametric free-entry model. Potential producers make entry
choices and then compete across a possibly large number of variables; such as price and
advertising. A producer’s proﬁt depends only on the distribution of its rivals’ actions and
not on any particular rival’s choices. This allows the transformation of a free-entry equilib-
rium for a given market size into one for a market twice as large with double the number of
producers and the same distribution of their observable actions. Of course, the distribution
of producers’ actions could diﬀer across large and small markets even without substantial
strategic interaction if the production technology and consumer tastes systematically change
with market size. I eliminate dependence of an individual’s demand and producers’ costs on
1market size in the model by assumption; and the regressions control for diﬀerences in produc-
tion possibilities and consumer tastes across U.S. cities with factor prices and demographic
measures.
Previous contributions to international trade and industrial organization have recognized
the importance of oligopolistic competition in large markets, but this recognition has taxed
the desire to work with analytically tractable models. Standard Chamberlinian monopolistic
competition cannot capture the idea that increasing market size makes competition “ﬁercer”
by increasing the number of producers, but true oligopoly models with strategic interaction
raise diﬃcult issues of dynamic game theory that are not necessarily central to a particular
author’s problem. This diﬃculty has led some authors to use a model with a continuum of
producers and goods due to Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002), in which the elasticity
of any given good’s demand decreases with the number of goods oﬀered even though no two
producers compete head-to-head. Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) show that such a model
predicts ﬁrm size to increase with market size, because the product of the falling markup
with ﬁrms’ average sales must equal the constant ﬁxed cost of entry. Their empirical results
conﬁrm this relationship for a large number of U.S. retail trade industries. Asplund and
Nocke (2006) and Nocke (2006)ﬁnd that an otherwise-standard model of industry dynamics
with this speciﬁcation predicts that producer entry and exit rates increase with market size.
Asplund and Nocke’s observations of Swedish hairdressers and Syverson’s (2004) observations
of U.S. concrete industries support this conclusion. I ﬁnd the opposite to be true for U.S.
restaurant industries. Apparently, the dynamic aspects of oligopolistic interaction that this
speciﬁcation omits are unimportant for the industries examined by Asplund and Nocke and
Syverson, but they substantially lower restaurants’ exit rates in larger markets.
The approach to evaluating competition in large markets I advocate in this paper has
one limit worth noting. A model in which oligopolists successfully collude and keep markups
at their monopoly level but do not deter entry will replicate the scale invariance of atom-
istic competition. That is, the test has no power to reject the null in favor of the speciﬁc
2alternative of collusion with free entry. The empirical results of this paper as well as those
of Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) and Yeap (2005) indicate that this lack of power is not
a practical problem for work with U.S. data.
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section sets the stage for the
analysis with an empirical examination of how restauranteurs’ decisions vary with market
size. Section 3 then provides a structural interpretation of these nonparametric results using
the general model of atomistic competition. Section 4 relates this paper’s results to those
from the relevant literature, and Section 5 oﬀers some concluding remarks.
2 Competition among Restaurants
To motivate this paper’s analysis, consider the U.S. Restaurant industry. The U.S. Census
questions the population of restaurants about their sales, cuisine, and pricing decisions every
ﬁve years when creating the Economic Census. These observations allow researchers to
address fundamental questions about the process of business formation, growth, and exit;
but they contain only little information about the potential for strategic interactions. This
is particularly the case for restaurants in cities, who have a great scope for diﬀerentiating
themselves by location and cuisine.
The hypothesis that the ﬁrms in this data set compete atomistically can greatly simplify
its analysis, because each ﬁrm’s actions can be cast as the outcome of a single-agent decision
problem. This simpliﬁcation could come at a high price if strategic interaction is a ﬁrst-order
feature of competition, so I desire a simple procedure that can evaluate it before proceeding
with a more complicated analysis.
Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) use a symmetric model of oligopolists with constant
marginal cost to build such a procedure. They note that oligopolists’ average sales must rise
with market size if their markups fall with additional entry, because they must recover the
same ﬁxed cost with a lower markup by selling more. Hence, modelling an industry as a
3collection of oligopolies seems promising if we see average sales rising with market size. The
two shortcomings of their procedure are its reliance on a stylized model of competition and
its exclusive focus on producers’ average sales. This paper constructs a very general model
of the null hypothesis which implies that all observable producer decisions are invariant to
market size. The following description of how U.S. restauranteurs’ actions vary with market
size provides this theoretical analysis with a concrete empirical context.
2.1 Data
For this paper, I use observations from the 1992 Census of Retail Trade for the same sample of
MSAs examined by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005). The volume RC92-S-4, “Miscellaneous
Subjects”, reports the number of restaurants operating at any time during 1992 and at the
end of that year. These observations immediately yield one measure of the annual exit rate.
This volume also reports restaurants’ average seating capacities for each MSA, the sales of all
restaurants and of those operating at the end of the year, and the fraction of restaurants with
typical meal prices greater than or equal to $5.00. Although the Census records information
about each restaurant’s cuisine, this information is not disclosed publicly by MSA.1
From these observations, we construct four variables of interest. The ﬁrst summarizes
ﬁrms’ pricing decisions. Denote the fraction of restaurants charging a typical meal price of
$5.00 or more with S($5.00), and consider its logistic transformation
L($5.00) ≡ ln(S($5.00)/(1 − S($5.00))
This is the logarithm of the ratio of “high priced” restaurants’ share of the population to
that of their “low priced” counterparts. Figure 1 plots this variable against the demeaned
logarithm of MSA population. The observations corresponding to the smallest and largest
MSA’s (Enid, OK and Atlanta, GA) are labelled, as are the observations with extreme values
1It would be desirable to examine more recent observations. Unfortunately, the Census has not published
MSA level observations of these variables from the two most recent Economic Censuses.
4of the log relative market share. The median value of S($5.00) across the sample’s MSA’s is
0.67. The Census reports that only 13 percent of restaurants in Rocky Mount, NC charge
$5.00 or more for a meal, and it reports that 96 percent of restaurants charge $5.00 or more in
both Longview-Marshall TX and Jackson, MS. Aside from these three outliers, the minimum
and maximum values of S($5.00) are 0.32 and 0.92. The correlation between the log relative
market share and MSA population equals 0.09.
The second variable of interest measures one aspect of industry dynamics, the exit rate.
I constructed this by dividing the number of ﬁrms operating at some time of the year but
not at the end of the year by the total number of ﬁrms to operate in that year. The plot of
this against MSA log population in Figure 2 shows a negative correlation. The exit rate for
Enid, OK is very close to the maximum observed, 19 percent, while that for Atlanta, GA is
close to the median across all MSA’s, 10.3 percent. The correlation between these variables
equals −0.11.
The other two variables of interest both measure average restaurant size, restaurants’
average revenue and average seating capacity. This average revenue variable diﬀers diﬀers
from that used by Campbell and Hopenhayn only because it excludes restaurants not oper-
ating at the end of the year. Figures 3 and 4 plot these variables against MSA population.
The strong positive association between MSA population and sales revenue documented by
Campbell and Hopenhayn is evident in Figure 3. Figure 4 reveals little correlation between
MSA population and average seating capacity.
2.2 Regression Results
Let Yi denote the value of one of these four measures of restaurateurs’ actions for MSA i,
and use Si and Wi to represent that MSA’s population and a vector of control variables
that includes relevant factor prices and consumer demographics. The factor prices account
for larger cities’ higher cost of commercial space and wages and lower cost of advertising
per consumer exposure. The demographic variables control for diﬀerences in preferences
5associated with income, race, and education that could shift the the nature of producers’
products and thereby indirectly inﬂuence their observable decisions. These control variables
are identical to those used in Campbell and Hopenhayn). The regression of Yi on lnSi and
Wi is
Yi = m(lnSi,Wi) + Ui.
Here, m(·) is not restricted to a particular functional form.2
The curse of dimensionality makes the estimation of m(lnS,W) infeasible. However, it
is still possible to test the hypothesis that its dependence on lnS is trivial using estimates















where f (lnS,W) is the joint density function of lnS and W across markets and expectations
are taken with respect to the same joint density function. Powell, Stock, and Stoker (1989)
provide a simple instrumental variables estimator of δS and δW which converges to the true
parameter values at the parametric rate of
√
N. If market size does not directly impact
producers’ decisions, then δS = 0.
For the four measures of restaurateurs’ actions, Table 1 reports the estimated values
of δS and δW along with consistent estimates of their asymptotic standard errors. Before
estimation, the elements of W were scaled by the standard deviation of lnS, which is 0.86 in
this sample. Powell et al.’s (1989) estimator requires a ﬁrst-stage nonparametric estimation
of ∂f(lnS,W)/∂ lnS and ∂f(lnS,W)/∂W. The estimates reported here are based on the
tenth-order bias-reducing kernel of Bierens (1987) and use a bandwidth equal to 2. To
increase the precision of the estimates’ reports, all entries in the table and in the text have
been multiplied by 100.
2In the case where Yi = ln(Si($5.00)/(1 − Si($5.00)), this speciﬁcation for the regression function is
equivalent to assuming that Si($5.00) = em(lnSi,Wi)+Ui/(1 + em(lnSi,Wi)+Ui).
6The estimate of δS for the regression of L($5.00) equals −12.90 and is statistically sig-
niﬁcant at the 5 percent level. Thus, restaurants in larger markets charge lower prices given
factor costs. To gauge the magnitude of this coeﬃcient, consider an MSA with S($5.00) at
the median level of 0.67. Set all of the elements of W equal to their means and consider
increasing S by one standard deviation. If we assume that ∂m(lnS,W)/∂ lnS is constant,
then such an increase in lnS decreases S($5.00) to 0.65. The hypothesis that increasing mar-
ket size lowers prices permeates empirical industrial organization, but to date only Syverson
(Forthcoming) has veriﬁed that this is so for a particular industry. This ﬁnding that typical
meal prices fall with market size complements his results.
The coeﬃcients on two of the factor costs, commercial rent and the retail wage, are
positive. They are both statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level, so the regression
conﬁrms the basic intuition that prices rise with factor costs. The third factor price, the cost
of purchasing 1,000 advertising exposures in a Sunday newspaper, has a negative coeﬃcient
which is statistically signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level. Perhaps high advertising costs allow
producers to segment the market more eﬀectively, thereby raising prices. Certainly, the eﬀect
of advertising costs on restaurant prices merits further investigation.
The estimate of δS for the exit rate is also negative, −0.77, and statistically signiﬁcant
at the 5 percent level. This implies that doubling S decreases restaurants’ exit rate by
0.53 percentage points. As Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) document, an increase in lnS
strongly raises restaurants’ average revenue. The estimated coeﬃcient is 4.68, and it is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant at the one-percent level.3 The ﬁnal dependent variable is the logarithm
of average seats per restaurant. The estimated coeﬃcient is positive, 2.07, but its standard
error equals 1.99. Hence, these observations are uninformative about whether the increase in
average revenue per restaurant arises from increased capacity utilization or increased average
3This estimate diﬀers greatly from that reported by Campbell and Hopenhayn (2005) for the iden-
tical regression with nearly the same sample. The discrepancy between the two reﬂects an error in
Campbell and Hopenhayn’s calculations. An erratum to that paper available at http://www.nber.org/˜
jrc/marketsizematters corrects that error.
7capacity. Nevertheless, the estimates in Table 1 clearly indicate that important decisions of
restauranteurs vary systematically with market size.
The estimates in Table 1 depend on the particular measure of market size (population)
and the bandwidth choice. Table 2 examines the robustness of the estimates of δS to these
choices. Its ﬁrst column reproduces the estimates from the ﬁrst row of Table 1, and its next
two columns report alternative estimates based on measuring market size with geographic
population density and the number of housing units. Using either of these alternatives brings
the estimate of δS for the regression of L($5.00) closer to zero. It equals −8.91 and has a
p-value of 12 percent with population density, and it equals −11.93 with a p-value of 5.4
percent using housing units. All other inferences are invariant to changing the measure
of market size. The ﬁnal two columns of Table 2 report estimates based on changing the
bandwidth h from its baseline value of 2 to either 1 or 3. Changing the bandwidth moves the
estimated standard errors in the opposite direction. Otherwise, the estimates are unaﬀected.
The only inference to change relative to the baseline speciﬁcation is in the regression of
L($5.00). When h = 1, the p-value for δS equals 10.3 percent.
I have undertaken three other checks of these estimates’ robustness worth mentioning
here. First, I have estimated all of the regression equations using ordinary least squares. The
estimated coeﬃcients are similar to the nonparametric estimates of δS. The only notable
change in inference regards the coeﬃcient in the regression of L($5.00). Its estimate drops to
−9.79, and its p-value rises to 6.6 percent. Second, the Census reports the share of restaurants
charging less than $7.00 per meal. When I regress L($7.00) on lnS and W, I ﬁnd no eﬀect of
market size on prices. Apparently, the reduction of restaurant prices occurs at the market’s
“low end”. Nothing in principle prevents estimating δS using the original values of S($5.00)
as a dependent variable. When I do so, the p-value for δS rises to 5.9 percent. Finally, I
have also constructed analogues of Tables 1 and 2 for a sister industry, Refreshment Places.
In that industry, market size has no measurable eﬀect on typical meal prices, but its eﬀects
on the other three dependent variables are the same as with Restaurants.
83 A General Model of Atomistic Competition
The results of the previous section clearly conﬂict with very basic models of atomistic compe-
tition. Consider for example Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) model of Chamberlinian monopolistic
competition. Its free-entry condition implies that each ﬁrm’s sales equals the product of the
exogenous ﬁxed cost with consumers’ constant elasticity of demand. Doubling the number
of consumers leaves producers’ average sales unchanged. In this section, I show that the
abstraction from strategic interaction is the sole source of the conﬂict between such simple
models and the data. Their other simplifying features are not to blame.
To do so, I develop the cross-market predictions of atomistic competition in a very general
model with no parametric restrictions. So that the analysis is as broadly applicable as
possible, I do not present speciﬁc conditions to guarantee the existence and uniqueness of a
free-entry equilibrium. Instead, the analysis begins with the assumption that an equilibrium
exists for a particular market size, and it then constructs an equilibrium with the same
observable distribution of producers’ actions for a larger market.
To make following the general model easier, this section begins with a speciﬁc example of
atomistic competition. It then proceeds to the general model, referring back to the speciﬁc
example to explain its moving parts.
3.1 A Speciﬁc Example
Consider a market for restaurant meals of heterogeneous quality. Production takes place in
two stages, entry and competition. In the entry stage, a large number of potential restau-
rateurs simultaneously decide whether to pay a sunk cost of i to enter the market or to
remain inactive at zero cost. After the restaurateurs commit to their entry decisions, each
restaurant receives a random endowment of quality, which can equal either the high value
qH with probability w or the low value qL with the complementary probability.
The competitive stage consists of two periods, early and late. All entrants can operate
9with zero ﬁxed costs in the early period, but continuing to the late period requires paying a
continuation cost i0. Exit allows a restaurateur to avoid this cost. In both periods, consumers
randomly match with restaurants. The market is populated by S identical consumers, and
equal numbers of them match with each restaurant. Restaurateurs simultaneously post their
prices, and consumers decide on their purchases. A consumer matched with a restaurant
charging a price p for a meal of quality q purchases d(p/q) meals. This demand function
is strictly decreasing and concave. Restaurants’ variable cost functions are identical and
feature a constant marginal cost of production, m.
A free entry equilibrium consists of a number of entrants, N, quality-contingent pricing
decisions for each of the two periods, and quality contingent exit decisions such that each
active restaurateur maximizes proﬁt, entry earns a non-negative return, and no inactive
potential entrant regrets staying out of the market. It is straightforward to show that this
model has a unique free-entry equilibrium. First, consider the restaurants’ pricing decisions,








Because d(·) is concave, there is a unique price that satisﬁes this for each quality level. The
optimal price increases with the restaurant’s quality.
The assumption of a constant marginal cost implies that a restaurant earns a constant
proﬁt per customer. Denote these with πL and πH for the low and high quality restau-
rants. Restaurateurs’ exit decisions depend on these proﬁts, the number of entrants, and the
cost of continuation. Denote the number of active restaurants in the late period with N0.




       
       
N if i0 ≤ (S/N) × πL,
S
πL
i0 if (S/N) × πL < i0 ≤ (S/wN) × πL,
wN if (S/wN) × πL < i0 ≤ (S/wN)πH,
S
πH
i0 if (S/wN)πH < i0.
10In the ﬁrst case all restaurants can proﬁtably produce during the late period. In the second
case, low-quality restaurants exit until their continuation value equals zero. In the third
case, all low-quality restaurants exit, but all high-quality restaurants continue. In the ﬁnal
case, the continuation cost is high enough so that high-quality restaurants exit until their
continuation value equals zero. The equilibrium exit decisions allow the deﬁnition of low
and high quality restaurants’ values at the beginning of the competitive stage, VL (S/N) and
VH (S/N). These are both strictly increasing in S/N, so there exists a unique value of N
that equates the ex-ante value of a new entrant with the entry cost.
Before proceeding to the general model, it is worth highlighting the scale invariance
of this free-entry equilibrium. Because the ex-ante value of an entrant depends only on
S/N, increasing the number of consumers raises the number of entrants proportionately.
Restaurants’ optimal prices depend on neither S nor N, while increasing both S and N
raises N0 by the same proportion and leaves the exit rate, 1 − N0/N, unchanged. Hence,
increasing the number of consumers in the market leaves the distributions of all observable
producer decisions unchanged.
This speciﬁc example is far too stylized for empirical work, but suppose for the moment
that it generated the MSA-level observations of restauranteurs’ decisions used in Section
2. If restaurateurs’ marginal costs and consumers’ demand curves depend on a vector of
market-speciﬁc variables like the factor prices and demographics in W, then regressions of
restaurants’ exit rate and of the fraction of restaurants with “high” prices on this vector and
lnS would detect no dependence of these market-level summaries of producer actions on
market size. In this sense, the speciﬁc example yields a testable prediction for cross-market
comparisons of producer actions. The fact that the results in Section 2 refute this prediction
implies that this very simple model could not have generated the data in hand. The analysis
of the general model demonstrates that the conﬂict arises from the assumption of atomistic
competition rather than one of the example’s other simplifying assumptions.
113.2 The General Model
Like the speciﬁc example, the general model consists of two stages, entry and comptition.
In the ﬁrst stage, a large number of potential entrants simultaneously make their entry
decisions. At the same time, entering producers make their product choices. That of a
particular entrant is x, and this lies in the set of all possible choices, X ⊂ Rk, where k < ∞.
The number of producers that made choice x is F (x) ∈ N, which I call the industry’s entry
proﬁle. The example did not make restaurateurs’ product choices explicit, but this can be
remedied by assuming that they choose product addresses in R and that all consumers match
in equal numbers with all oﬀered products .
In the second stage, producers compete to sell their products to the market’s S consumers.
Producers simultaneously choose actions, a ∈ A ⊂ Rl, where l < ∞. Producers’ proﬁts
depend on these choices and on realization of a vector of aggregate shocks, Z, which occurs
before producers choose actions. An action proﬁle is a function A(x;Z,F) → A. If F (x0) >
0, then A(x0;Z,F) gives the action of a producer that chose x0 at entry. In the example,
a represents a restaurants’ early and late prices and its continuation probability and Z
determines restaurants’ qualities.4
For simplicity, we assume that if two or more entrants chose x, they both choose the
same post entry action.5 The total revenues of a producer at x0 that chooses the action a0
when all other producers’ use the action proﬁle A(x;Z,F) and the entry proﬁle is F (x) are
4The speciﬁc example relies on idiosyncratic shocks to entrants’ qualities. To use the general model’s
aggregate shocks to represent idiosyncratic shocks, assume that Z is a uniformly distributed location on
the unit-circumference circle and that a restaurant has high quality if the clockwise distance between x/N
(interpreted as a location on this circle) and Z is less than w. A potential entrant is indiﬀerent across all
locations on [0,N) if entrants uniformly distribute themselves on this interval, so such a uniform distribution
is an equilibrium outcome that generates the same distribution of high and low quality as in the example.
5As in the speciﬁc example, an element of a can represent a mixed strategy over a discrete and ﬁnite
set of actions; and the revenues and costs speciﬁed below can be reinterpreted as expected values. Hence
this assumption allows for mixed strategies. However, it does remove asymmetric Nash equilibria from
consideration.
12S × r(a0,x0;A,Z,F). Here, S denotes the number of consumers and r(·) is the producer’s
average revenue per consumer, which does not directly depend on S. That producer’s costs
are c(a0,x0;A,Z,F,S).
The expected post entry proﬁt to a producer choosing x0 at entry when it and its com-
petitors follow the action proﬁle A(x;Z,F) are
π (x





Here, the expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of Z. This expectation exists
under the assumption that that r(·) and c(·) are uniformly bounded functions of a and Z.
For the example, denote the prices charged by a restaurant and the probability that it
produces in the late period with a1, a2, and a3. The revenue and cost functions in the case




× d(a1/q) + a3 ×
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N0 × d(a2/q), and
c(·) = i + m ×
S
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d(a1/q) + a3 ×
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In these expressions, the restaurant’s quality q is the function of Z and x described in
Footnote 4.
Deﬁne a strategy proﬁle to be an action proﬁle A(x;Z,F) paired with an entry proﬁle
F (x) and denote it with (A,F). With this notation in place, the deﬁnition of a free-entry
equilibrium may proceed.6
Deﬁnition A strategy proﬁle (A?,F ?) is a free-entry equilibrium for a market with S
consumers if it satisﬁes the following conditions.
6Conventional notation for a dynamic game takes a set of players with names, a strategy space, and payoﬀ
functions as primitives. The application of that approach to this model would specify the set of players as
an unbounded set of potential entrants with names in Rk, the strategy space as X × {A(x;Z,F) ∈ A}, and
the payoﬀs as proﬁt deﬁned above. Because F (x) and Z directly index all subgames, working directly with
the strategy proﬁle as deﬁned here simpliﬁes the model’s exposition.












(b) For all x0 ∈ X, π (x0;A,F ? + I {x = x0},S) ≤ 0.




?,S) ≥ π (x
00;A
?,F
? + I {x = x
00} − I {x = x
0},S)
Condition (a) of this deﬁnition ensures that the action proﬁle A? (x;Z,F) forms a Nash
equilibrium for all subgames following the entry stage. Condition (b) requires that no further
entry is proﬁtable, and condition (c) states that each active producer’s entry decision and
choice of x is optimal given all other potential entrants’ decisions. Together, the deﬁnition’s
three conditions are equivalent to requiring the strategy proﬁle (A?,F ?) to correspond to a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium with pure strategies in the entry stage.
3.3 Atomistic Competition
At this level of generality, the framework encompasses many models. To specialize it and
thereby derive the implications of atomistic competition, we impose the following two con-
ditions. The ﬁrst condition allows for only trivial strategic interactions between producers
when no two of them occupy the same location in X, and the second ensures that no such
“local oligopolies” will arise in a free-entry equilibrium. Henceforth, I assume that X is a
Borel measurable set with positive measure, denote the set of its Borel measurable subsets
with M, and use µ(M) to denote the Borel measure of M ∈ M.
Assumption A1 (Atomistic Competition) Let (A,F) be a strategy proﬁle with F (x) ≤
1 and deﬁne M = {x|F(x) = 1}. If F(x) is Borel-measurable, µ(M) > 0, A(x;Z,F 0) is
14Borel-measurable given any shock realization Z and Borel-measurable entry proﬁle F 0, and
F(x0) = 1, then the revenues of the producer at x0 choosing the action a0 satisfy
S × r(a
0,x
0;A,Z,F) = S × ρ(a
0,x
0;G(A,Z,F),Z,NF),







I {A(x;Z,F) ≤ a
0} × F(x)dµ(x).
Two aspects of Assumption A1 capture the idea that producers compete atomistically.
First, a producer’s revenues only depend on its own choices, aggregate shocks, the mass
of competing producers, and the empirical distribution of their actions. Second, any one
producer has measure zero when computing this distribution, so changing a single producer’s
conduct alters no other producer’s revenue. The example revenue function above satisﬁes
Assumption A1, because each producer’s proﬁt depends on its rivals actions only through
S/N and S/N0. A ﬁnite-horizon version of Hopenhayn’s (1992) model of perfect competition
also satisﬁes Assumption A1. In any particular industry, the number of producers is obviously
countable and not continuous. Models of atomistic competition are of empirical interest
because their predictions might ﬁt the data well in spite of the false simplifying assumption
of a continuum of producers.
Assumption A2 (Product Diﬀerentiation) If F (x0) ≥ 2 and A satisﬁes condition (a)
of the deﬁnition of a free-entry equilibrium, then π (x0;A,F,S) < 0.
Assumption A2 states that competition between producers of identical products is tough
enough to guarantee that no more than one producer will occupy any location in X. Thus,
the observed market structure will not contain any “local” oligopolies; and competition is
“global” in the sense of Anderson and de Palma (2000). The speciﬁc example satisﬁes this
assumption. Any model in which ﬁrms’ producing exactly the same product act as Bertrand
competitors will satisfy Assumption A2.7
7A model with price-taking producers of a homogeneous good, such as Hopenhayn’s (1992), could accom-
modate this assumption by deﬁning a trivial product placement choice x on the real line and assuming that
153.4 Intrinsic Scale Eﬀects
Thus far, the model’s speciﬁcation does not rule out direct eﬀects of the scale of the market,
measured with either S or NF, on producers’ revenues or costs. For example, the product
space might be limited so that entry cannot continue indeﬁnitely. The market shares of
producers with particular choices of x might be more or less sensitive to the size of the
market, or directly raising S could systematically reduce costs and so encourage entry and
production. For all of these reasons, the distribution of producers’ decisions across large and
small markets could diﬀer. The following three conditions eliminate them as a theoretical
possibility.
Assumption S1 (Invariance of Market Shares) The per consumer revenue function
ρ(·) is homogeneous of degree -1 in NF.
This assumption states that doubling the number of producers while holding the distribution
of their actions ﬁxed cuts each producer’s revenue in half. In the example, it follows from
the uniform random matching of consumers with ﬁrms. This assumption is closely related
to the independence of irrelevant alternatives: Adding a producer to a market does not
change the relative market shares of any two incumbents. The quadratic demand system
of Ottaviano, Tabuchi, and Thisse (2002) generally violates Assumption S1, because each
consumer’s elasticity of demand depends on the number of varieties for sale. This and
similar models hard-wire markups which decline with market size. These arise naturally
in true oligopoly models, so excluding them from the deﬁnition of atomistic competition is
appropriate if one wishes the deﬁnition to distinguish substantially between strategic and
anonymous competition.8
the cost of entry at a given “location” increases steeply with the number of entrants there.
8Whether or not one agrees with this distinction, the result of Asplund and Nocke (2006) implies that a
model which violates only Assumption S1 cannot reproduce the exit rate’s decline with market size docu-
mented in Section 2.
16Assumption S2 (No Productive Spillovers) For any entry choice x0 ∈ X,action a0 ∈


















Assumption S2 implies that is impossible to hold a producer’s choices of x and a ﬁxed,
change its competitive environment, and lower that producer’s costs without simultaneously
lowering its revenues. Any model in which producers’ costs depend only on their own actions
(such as a quantity setting game with no productive spillovers) satisﬁes this assumption. If
the market faces an upward sloping supply curve for some input, as in some versions of
Hopenhayn’s (1992) model, then this assumption would be violated. The simple aﬃne
technology of the example obviously satisﬁes Assumption S2.
Assumption S3 (Distinct Observationally-Equivalent Strategy Proﬁles) For any
market size S and strategy proﬁle (A,F) such that F(x) ≤ 1 for all x ∈ X, there exists
a continuous, one to one, and onto function g : X → X such that if we deﬁne F T (x) ≡
F (g−1 (x)), and AT(x;Z,F T) = A(g−1(x),Z,F) then
(a) ∀x ∈ X, F (x) + F T (x) ≤ 1;
(b) if F (x0) > 0, then
S × r(a
0,x



















(c) ∀M ∈ M, µ(g−1 (M)) = µ(M).
17In many models of competition with product diﬀerentiation, it is possible to rearrange
producers’ locations in X, hold their actions ﬁxed, and leave their payoﬀs unchanged. Con-
sider two examples of such a rearrangement, moving all producers a short distance to the
right in Salop’s (1979) circle model and changing the particular products chosen by entrants
in Dixit and Stiglitz’s (1977) model of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. In both
cases, the rearrangement leaves the game played after product placement unaltered. In As-
sumption S3, conditions (a) and (b) require such a rearrangement to be possible for any given
strategy proﬁle. In this section’s simple example, X is an inﬁnite set of all possible products
without any spatial structure or asymmetries in demand or cost, so such a rearrangement is
possible. Condition (c) requires g (x) to be measure preserving, so that the rearrangement
does not alter the mass of producers. Overall, Assumption S3 asserts that no location in X
has payoﬀ-relevant characteristics that are unique.
3.5 Equilibrium
The following two conditions ensure that potential entrants’ expectations about post-entry
competition can be well-deﬁned and that a free-entry equilibrium exists.
Assumption E1 (Existence of Nash Equilibrium) For any market size S, there exists
a strategy proﬁle A(x,Z,F) that satisﬁes condition (a) of the deﬁnition of a free-entry equi-
librium.
Assumption E2 (Existence of a Measurable Free Entry Equilibrium) There exists
a market size S0 > 0 with a corresponding free-entry equilibrium (A0,F0) such that
(a) F0(x) and A0(x;Z,F0) are Borel measurable functions of x for any Z, and
(b) A0(x0;Z,F) = A0(x0;Z,F0) if F(x0) = F0(x0) = 1 and F(x) = F0(x) almost every-
where.
18The goal of this section is to show that no well-deﬁned model of atomistic competition
can reproduce the dependence of ﬁrms’ choices on market size. A model that violates E1 can
make no equilibrium prediction for some market size, and a model that violates part (a) of E2
makes no prediction for any market size. In this speciﬁc sense, a model that violates either of
these assumptions is not well deﬁned. Part (b) of Assumption E2 eliminates the possibility
that a positive measure of ﬁrms respond to deviations from the equilibrium by a single
(measure zero) ﬁrm. That is, there is no producer whose actions act as a pure coordination
device for the others. Both E1 and E2 are clearly true for this section’s introductory example.
Accordingly, I view both assumptions as regularity conditions that any model must satisfy
before it could be taken seriously as an explanation for the data.
3.6 Market Size and Producers’ Actions
The speciﬁc example and many other models of monopolistic competition satisfy all of the
above assumptions. Together, they place suﬃcient structure on the model to imply the
following observational implication.
Proposition If S=2j × S0, where j is a non-negative integer and S0, A0, and F0 are
deﬁned in Assumption E2, then there exists a free entry equilibrium (Aj,Fj) such that
G(Aj,Z,Fj) = G(A0,Z,F0)
where G(A,Z,F) is as deﬁned in Assumption A1.
The proposition says that for every measurable equilibrium with a given market size
there exists a corresponding equilibrium for a market with twice as many consumers with
identical distributions of producers’ actions. Unless there exists more than one free-entry
equilibrium and the equilibrium selection rule systematically depends on S, there can be no
observable relationship between market size and the distribution of any producer choice. The
appendix presents the proposition’s proof. Here, I only outline the argument. Consider the
19free-entry equilibrium (A0,F0) for S0. We know from Assumption S3 that there is a diﬀerent






. Now consider a market with S1 =
2×S0 and entry proﬁle, F0+F T
0 . If all producers duplicate the actions they take in the smaller
market, then the empirical c.d.f. of producers actions remains unchanged, so Assumptions
A1, S1, and S2 imply that each producer’s proﬁt maximizing action remains unchanged.
That is, the action proﬁle that duplicates producers’ actions is a Nash equilibrium proﬁle
for this larger market size and entry proﬁle. Each producer’s proﬁts remain unchanged, and
the proﬁts from producing in an unoccupied location in X are identical to their value in the
original free entry equilibrium with the smaller market size, so conditions (b) and (c) of the
deﬁnition are satisﬁed. Each producer’s actions equal those from the original equilibrium,
so their empirical distributions are also unchanged as the proposition asserts.9
The proposition illustrates that the invariance of producers’ decisions to the market’s
size in the speciﬁc example extends well beyond its particular assumptions. All of the
assumptions excepting A1 are regularity conditions, so I interpret the fact that market size
does inﬂuence restauranteurs’ observable decisions as a rejection of atomistic competition.
3.7 Extensions
The general model is restrictive in two ways that are worth noting. First, it has no role for
actions that are taken prior to the realization of Z that do not directly diﬀerentiate ﬁrms’
products, such as investments that increase the likelihood of having a high quality restaurant.
Adding such pre competition actions to the general model increases its notational burden
but does not alter its scale invariance. Second, the use of the Borel integral to form the
c.d.f. of producers’ actions in Assumption A1 restricts product placement decisions to be
9The proposition’s focus on doubling market size can easily be changed if the assertion that g(x) is
measure preserving in Assumption S3 is replaced with the assumption that for any t > 1, there exists a
gt(x) satisfying the assumption’s other conditions and which satisﬁes µ(g
−1
t (M)) = t × µ(M). With this, a
parallel argument establishes that a free-entry equilibrium that replicates producers’ decisions exists for any
market size greater than S0.
20continuous choices. Scale invariance requires some continuous product placement decision
to diﬀerentiate ﬁrms’ products, but it does not require all product placement decisions to be
continuous. Extending the general model to allow for discrete dimensions of ﬁrms’ product-
placement decisions is straightforward.
3.8 Atomistic and Monopolistic Competition
Before concluding, it is helpful to clarify the relationship between what I have labelled
“atomistic competition” with the large theoretical literature on monopolistic competition.
For some authors, “monopolistic competition” refers to all imperfect competition among
a large number of producers. Models that prominently feature strategic interaction, such
as Salop’s (1979) model of spatial competition, then go by the label of “Hotelling-style”
monopolistic competition. Models with only trivial strategic considerations, such as Spence’s
(1976) are called “Chamberlin-style”.
Hart (1985) andWolinsky (1986) propose a more exclusive deﬁnition of “monopolistic
competition” based on four criteria.
(1) there are many ﬁrms producing diﬀerentiated commodities; (2) each ﬁrm is
negligible in the sense that it can ignore its impact on, and hence reactions from,
other ﬁrms; (3) each ﬁrm faces a downward sloping demand curve and hence the
equilibrium price exceeds marginal cost; (4) free entry results in zero-proﬁt of
operating ﬁrms (or, at least, of marginal ﬁrms).(Wolinsky, 1986, page 493)
These clearly correspond to what others call Chamberlin-style monopolistic competition.
Hart and Wolinsky’s ﬁrst two criteria correspond to Assumptions A2 and A1, and the fourth
criterion is implicit in the deﬁnition of a free-entry equilibrium. The deﬁnition of atomistic
competition does not require ﬁrms to face downward sloping demand curves, but it clearly
allows for that possibility. Hence, models of monopolistic competition (in the sense of Hart
and Wolinsky) can usually be written without economically substantial changes to satisfy the
21assumptions this paper places on atomistic competition. However, the deﬁnition of atomistic
competition is broad enough to also encompass models without market power.
4 Related Literature
Structure-conduct-performance studies gave rise to many examinations of competitive out-
comes’ dependence on market size. One strand of this literature uses the empirical relation-
ship between market size and the number of competitors to infer how adding competition
lowers markups. If doubling market size leads to a less than proportional increase in the
number of producers, either per-consumer proﬁts fall with entry or incumbents raise en-
trants’ ﬁxed costs. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) apply this approach to concentrated retail
automobile markets in isolated towns. Berry and Waldfogel (2006) examine the inﬂuence of
market size on the number of competitors in a slightly broader sample of MSAs than that
used in this paper, and they ﬁnd that the number of restaurants increases less than propor-
tionally with MSA population.10 The proof of this paper’s proposition makes it clear that
the number of producers in atomistically competitive markets is proportional to the number
of consumers, so Berry and Waldfogel’s ﬁnding reinforces this paper’s empirical conclusion.11
This paper’s proposition does not stress the relationship between market size and the
number of ﬁrms under atomistic competition, because a ﬁnding that doubling market size
less than doubles the number of ﬁrms could arise solely from measurement error in market
size. Measurement error could make the rejection of this paper’s exclusion restrictions less
likely when they are false, but it does not lead directly to their rejection when they are
true. In this sense, a test of atomistic competition based on the relationship between noisily
10See the third and fourth columns of their Table 3.
11Berry and Waldfogel’s ﬁnding also manifests itself in the observations used in the present paper. The
estimate of δs from a nonparametric regression of the number of restaurants’ logarithm on population’s
logarithm and the other control variables listed in Table 1 using Campbell and Hopenhayn’s (2005) sample
of MSAs equals 0.93, and this is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from one.
22measured market size and measures of producer actions is conservative.12
This paper derives testable predictions of a free-entry model without the use of parametric
assumptions. In this respect, Sutton’s (1991) analysis of models with endogenous sunk costs
precedes it. He considers a model of competition in which entrants compete with sunk
investments in product quality. The ﬁrm with the greatest investment earns a guaranteed
minimum market share, regardless of the number of other producers. Sutton shows that
these features together imply a nonparametric upper bound on the number of entrants, and
he demonstrates that cross-country data from several advertising-intensive food-processing
industries satisfy this bound. As the number of consumers grows, the number of entrants
remains bounded from above. In this sense, industries that satisfy his model’s assumptions
are natural oligopolies. As noted above in Subsection 3.7, it is notationally burdensome
but straightforward to add pre-entry investments in quality to this paper’s model. This
extension leaves the model’s nonparametric testable implications unaltered. In particular,
the number of producers grows linearly with market size. The contrast between that result
and Sutton’s highlights the role of endogenous sunk costs in his results: They are necessary
but not suﬃcient for an industry to be a natural oligopoly. Hence, the simple observation
that an industry’s producers incur endogenous sunk costs does not imply that its ﬁrms
are oligopolists. However, tests of the exclusion restrictions from atomistic competition do
provide information about the nature of competition.
The analysis of the exit of restaurants places this paper in another vast literature which
examines the rate of producer turnover and the reallocation of resources between ﬁrms.
These papers have focused on diﬀerences in ﬁrm growth and survival across the life cycle (as
in Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988)) and on the interaction of resource reallocation
with the business cycle (as in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996), Campbell (1998), and
12Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) can measure market size accurately because they carefully chose their
sample towns. This strategy becomes infeasible when considering competition in large markets in which the
deﬁnition of the market and industry are themselves somewhat subjective, so prudence requires accounting
for possible measurement error.
23Campbell and Lapham (2004)). Analysis of how the pace of resource reallocation varies
with local market conditions, similar to that in this paper, is much scarcer. Syverson (2004)
shows that ready-mixed concrete producers serving geographically concentrated markets
have higher average productivity and less productivity dispersion than their counterparts in
more sparsely populated areas, and he interprets this as the result of more intense selection
in highly competitive markets. As noted in the introduction, Asplund and Nocke (2006)
create a model of such selection by incorporating markups which depend on the number of
producers into an otherwise standard model of industry dynamics with Chamberlinian mo-
nopolistic competition. They conﬁrm Syverson’s ﬁnding by showing that Swedish hairstylists
are younger in larger markets. This paper ﬁnds the opposite relationship between market
size and exit for U.S. restaurants. Together, this paper’s theoretical results and those of As-
plund and Nocke imply that dynamic aspects of strategic interaction substantially inﬂuence
the rate of restaurant turnover.
5 Conclusion
Researchers’ prior beliefs about the usefulness of diﬀerent modelling approaches inﬂuence
their investigations of industries. The relative simplicity of atomistic competition models
makes them a tempting ﬁrst choice for the empirical study of competition in large mar-
kets. However, those who believe that strategic interaction permeates all producers’ choices
have chosen to focus instead on industries with few competitors and relatively well-deﬁned
strategic environments. This paper’s results are of use to both sorts of researchers. For
those who regularly abstract from strategic interaction, the nonparametric test of atomistic
competition can be used to subject this assumption to empirical scrutiny before proceeding
to a more involved investigation.13 For those unwilling to part from a strategic focus, the
regressions indicate the dimensions of the data along which strategic interaction manifests
13For example, Abbring and Campbell (2006) apply this papers’ results to test the assumption of atomistic
competition in their structural model of new Texas bars’ growth and exit decisions.
24itself quantitatively. This is an essential ﬁrst step to extending the strategic analysis of
competition to large markets.
The application of this paper’s theoretical analysis to observations of U.S. restaurants’
prices, exit rates, sales, and seating capacity indicates that atomistic competition cannot
explain how restauranteurs’ key choices depend on market size. A particularly important
aspect of this is that exit rates fall with market size. In related work, Yeap (2005) doc-
uments that this increase in average size reﬂects only the decisions of ﬁrms owning two
or more restaurants. Taken together these ﬁndings indicate that better understanding of
competition among restaurants in large markets requires confronting restaurateurs’ strate-
gic behavior. Toivanen and Waterson (2005) take an important step in this direction by
empirically modelling entry decisions into well deﬁned duopoly fast-food markets. Extend-
ing such an analysis to large samples of restaurants without high-quality information about
market deﬁnitions and strategic interactions is the subject of my current research with Jaap
Abbring.
Proof of the Proposition
Clearly, the proposition is true for j = 0. We now wish to show that it is true for j = 1.
The proposition can then be demonstrated recursively for greater values of j.
Let g (x) be the function assumed to exist in Assumption S3. Deﬁne the entry proﬁle
F1 (x) = F0 (x) + F T
0 (x), where the latter entry proﬁle is deﬁned as in the statement of
Assumption S3. From Assumption A2 and the deﬁnition of a free-entry equilibrium, we know
that F0 (x) ∈ {0,1}. Therefore, condition (a) of Assumption S3 ensures that F1 (x) ∈ {0,1}.
We know from Assumption E1 that there exists an action proﬁle A(x;Z,F) that satisﬁes
condition (a) of a free-entry equilibrium’s deﬁnition for S1 = 2×S0. We now wish to use this
and A0 (x;Z,F) to construct an action proﬁle that forms a candidate free-entry equilibrium
when paired with F1. For any entry proﬁle F (x) such that either
25(i) F (x0) ≥ 2 for some x0 ∈ X or
(ii) {x|F (x) 6= F1 (x)} is either not measurable or has positive measure,
deﬁne A1 (x;Z,F) = A(x;Z,F).
For any entry proﬁle F (x) ∈ {0,1} for which F (x) = F1 (x) almost everywhere, there
exists two measurable sets Cp and Cm with µ(Cp) = µ(Cm) = 0 and F (x) = F1 (x) +
I {x ∈ Cp}−I {x ∈ Cm}. Deﬁne F0 (Cp)(x) = F0 (x)+I {x ∈ Cp}. If F (x) = 1, then either
F0 (Cp)(x) = 1 or F T






A0 (x;Z,F0 (Cp)) if F0 (Cp)(x) = 1,
A0 (g−1 (x);Z,F0 (Cp)) otherwise.
Because the composition of Borel measurable functions is itself Borel measurable, A1 (x;Z,F)
is a Borel measurable function of x.
The next step is to show that (A1,F1) is a free-entry equilibrium. To do so, consider the
deﬁnition’s three conditions in turn.
Condition (a)
Note that by construction A1 (x;Z,F) satisﬁes the inequality in condition (a) of a free-entry
equilibrium’s deﬁnition if it satisﬁes either (i) or (ii) above. Suppose that F (x) ∈ {0,1} and








































The ﬁrst equality holds because F1 and F0 (Cp)+F 0
0 (Cp) diﬀer by a set of measure zero, and
the last equality follows from Proposition 1 in Chapter 15 of Royden (1988).
26With this and Assumptions A1 and S1, we can conclude that if F0 (Cp)(x) = 1, then for



















The action A0 (x0;Z,F0 (Cp)) = A1 (x0;Z,F) maximizes the right-hand side, so it must also
maximize its left-hand side.
Alternatively, if F 0
0 (Cp)(x) = 1, then we can construct a parallel argument to show
that A1 (x0,Z,F) maximizes the ﬁrm’s proﬁt. Thus A1 (x,Z,F) satisﬁes condition (a) of a
free-entry equilibrium’s deﬁnition.
Condition (b)
Next, consider condition (b) of the deﬁnition. Extending the notation above, denote F1 (x)+
I {x = x0} with F1 ({x0})(x), If F1 (x0) = 1, then the deﬁnition of A1 and Assumptions
A2 and E1 imply that π (x0;A1,F1 ({x0}),S) ≤ 0. Next, note that if F1 (x0) = 0, then we
know from above that G(A1,Z,F1 ({x0}))(a) = G(A0,Z,F0 ({x0}))(a), and that NF1({x0}) =
2 × NF0({x0}). Therefore, Assumptions A1, S1, and S2 and the deﬁnition of a free-entry
equilibrium imply that π (x0;A1,F1 ({x0}),S) ≤ 0 in this case as well. Hence, condition (b)
of the deﬁnition is satisﬁed.
Condition (c)
Finally, consider condition (c) of a free-entry equilibrium’s deﬁnition. Because
G(A1,Z,F1)(a) = G(A0,Z,F0)(a)
and NF1 = 2 × NF0, so if F0 (x0) = 1 then
π (x
0;A1,F1,S1) = π (x
0;A0,F0,S0) ≥ 0.
27Furthermore, conditions (b) and (c) of Assumption S3 imply that this inequality also applies
if F T
0 (x0) = 1. Therefore, the ﬁrst inequality in condition (c) of the deﬁnition holds good.
The second inequality in this condition holds trivially from Assumption A2 and the
deﬁnition of A1 if F1 (x00) = 1. Suppose instead that F1 (x00) = 0 and F1 (x0) = 1. We know
that F1 (x) + I {x = x00} − I {x = x0} = F1 (x) + I {x = x00} almost everywhere. From this
and the fact that we have already veriﬁed condition (b) of an equilibrium’s deﬁnition, we
conclude that
π (x
00;A1,F1 + I {x = x
00} − I {x = x
0},S1) ≤ 0.
Thus, the second inequality of condition (c) holds and (A1,F1) is a free-entry equilibrium.
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31Table 1: Nonparametric Regression Estimates(i,ii,iii)
Log Average
L($5.00) Exit Rate Revenue Seats per Restaurant
Population -12.90?? -0.77?? 4.68??? 2.07
(6.13) (0.32) (1.76) (1.99)
Commercial Rent 11.16? -0.29 1.66 -2.23
(6.29) (0.30) (1.53) (1.89)
Retail Wage 17.37?? 0.69?? -0.49 -2.56
(7.12) (0.35) (1.56) (2.18)
Advertising Cost -9.00? -0.30 -1.43 -0.35
(5.47) (0.27) (1.65) (1.95)
Income -1.67 -0.55? 6.17??? 4.90??
(7.03) (0.33) (1.63) (2.39)
Percent Black 20.89??? 0.62?? 0.90 -3.95?
(5.91) (0.26) (1.31) (2.16)
Percent College 19.70??? -0.09 8.48??? 2.50
(6.22) (0.33) (1.28) (1.83)
Vehicle Ownership -2.41 -0.57?? -1.16 1.38
(5.08) (0.28) (1.58) (2.00)
Notes: (i) The table reports estimates of density-weighted average derivatives from the
regressions of the indicated variables on the regressors listed in the ﬁrst column. Asymptotic
standard errors appear below each estimate in parentheses. The superscripts ?, ??, and ???
indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels (ii) In the table, L($5.00)
refers to the logistic transformation of the fraction of restaurants in an MSA with typical
meal prices greater than or equal to $5.00. (iii) All estimates have been multiplied by 100.


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Logistic Transformation of the Share of Establishments with High Meal Prices(i)
Note: The ﬁgure plots the logistic transofrmation of the share of establishments with typical
meal prices exceeding $5.00 against the demeaned logarithm of MSA population.




Figure 2: Restaurants’ Annual Exit Rate in Percentage Points




Figure 3: Logarithm of Restaurants’ Average Revenue




Figure 4: Logarithm of Average Seats per Restaurant
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